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Abstract: The robust provision of position navigation and timing (PNT) 
information for vessel navigation is an objective of e-Navigation strategy 
identified by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). In this paper 
we will introduce the idea of a ship-side PNT Module as front-end 
between an integrated PNT system and ship-side applications like INS, 
AIS and ECDIS. The focus of this paper lies in the discussion of the 
integrity monitoring aspects of such a PNT Module. In the last part of the 
paper we will show first experimental results.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The maritime integrated PNT System (Figure 1) is the sum of satellite-
based, ashore and aboard components. The integrated use of these components 
enables the accurate and reliable provision of position, navigation and timing 
information to all maritime applications. 
Position fixing systems are identified as one strategic key element of e-
navigation [1]. Existing and future Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) 
like GPS, GLONASS and GALILEO are fundamental infrastructures for global 
positioning. Additionally, terrestrial services are used or considered as 
candidates to improve the positioning performance (augmentation services: e.g. 
IALA Beacon DGNSS, RTK) or to ensure the backup functionality (backup 
services: e.g. e-LORAN, R-Mode) respectively to GNSS. Due to their 
interoperability and compatibility these systems can be used alternatively or 
complementary for positioning, navigation and timing. 
Several performance standards for shipborne GNSS and DGNSS receivers 
were developed and approved by IMO in the last decade: GPS, GLONASS, 
DGPS and DGLONASS, combined GPS/GLONASS, and GALILEO. A logical 
consequence of this standardization process could be the preparation of a new 
performance standard for a multi-system radio navigation receiver as core 
element of the on-board part of the PNT System (Fig.I). A more generally 
admitted approach can be achieved by the introduction of an onboard integrated 
PNT Module. 
The on-board integrated PNT Module aims at the provision of position, 
navigation and timing information in accordance with changing performance 
requirements during berth to berth navigation. The core of the on-board 
integrated PNT Module is a value-added processing system (PNT Unit) using 
available radio navigation systems and services in combination with on-board 
sensors for accurate and reliable provision of PNT-information. The on-board 
PNT Module is on the one hand part of the integrated PNT system and on the 
other hand part of the on-board Integrated Navigation System (INS). 
 
 
Figure I Integrated PNT System (dark grey: standard, light grey: considered options) 
  
The idea behind the introduction of integrated PNT Module is, that from 
our prospective only the combined usage of all available navigation sensors will 
be able to satisfy the user needs such as “Indication and Improvement of 
Reliability” and “Alarm Management” [1] identified within the framework of 
the e-Navigation process. This integrated usage of navigation sensors improves 
the robustness of PNT information and enables the assessment of accuracy by 
suitable integrity monitoring functions. The type of implementable redundancy 
(equipment, different measurement methods, over determined systems, 
alternative applicable techniques) specifies the potential of error detection, 
identification and mitigation within the PNT Module. 
 
2. Technical  Requirements  
 
One of the basic requirements to be clarified is the extent of PNT 
information delivered by a PNT Module. In a preliminary design, the following 
parameters are considered: 
1 Position (longitude, latitude) 
2 Under keel clearance (UKC) 
3 Velocity: speed over ground (SOG) and course over ground (COG) 
4 Attitude: roll, pitch yaw (heading) 
5 Timing: UTC time  
 
In the next step further additional requirements on the PNT Unit will be 
discussed. 
In [1], the robustness of all e-navigation systems is requested. In order to 
fulfill this requirement, a definition of robustness needs to be given. We inter-
pret robustness as the ability of a system to provide the output data according to 
their specification under changing application conditions and in cases of ex-
ternal disturbances (interferences, jamming, atmospheric influences). The 
robustness shall therefore be applicable to the realization of the basic functional-
ity (output data with required accuracy) and integrity functionality. 
In [1] it is furthermore stated, that requirements for redundancy, particularly 
in relation to position fixing systems, should be considered. Redundancy in a 
general meaning can be seen as the provision of an alternative system to support 
fundamental system functionalities. Within the Recommendation R-129 on 
GNSS Vulnerability and Mitigation Measures [3] IALA has given a 
classification of alternative navigation systems in relation to their aims: 
1 A redundant system provides the same functionality as the primary 
system, allowing a seamless transition with no change in procedures. 
2 A backup system ensures continuation of the navigation application, but 
not necessarily with the full functionality of the primary system and may 
necessitate some change in procedures by the user. 
3 A contingency system allows safe completion of a manoeuvre, but may 
not be adequate for long-term use 
. 
For the introduction of additional sensors to the integrated PNT Unit, this 
classification scheme needs to be considered.  
 
3.  Sensors for an onboard PNT Module  
 
In a scalable design different sensors could be used in an onboard PNT 
Module. These sensors can be distinguished into exiting maritime standard 
sensors and possible additional sensors. An overview of the sensors and a 
discussion of the related standards can be found in [4]. Here only a list of 
sensors and their output parameters should be given. The rows with white 
background represent the standard sensors, whereas the rows with dark 
background represent the non-standard sensors which will be shortly introduced 
in the latter parts. 
 
TABLE I. SENSORS AND OUTPUT 
 Pos COG SOG True Heading ROT Time UKC 
Major GNSS device M M R   M  
Second GNSS device R R R R B R  
Second GNSS system R R R   R  
Second GNSS signal R R R   R  
EM Log   B     
Doppler Log   M     
Magnet Compass    B B   
Gyrocompass    M B   
THD     B   
ROT indicator     M   
Echo sounder       M 
IMU C C C C C   
e-Loran B     B  
R-mode B     B  
e-Pelorus C   C    
R: Redundant B: Backup C: Contingency M: Main sensor 
  
Due to vulnerability of GNSS adequate backup or contingency systems are 
required in the GNSS system failure event. Using the standard sensors it is 
difficult to handle GNSS outages, and hence the following techniques can be 
considered: 
 
(A)  Carriage of an additional GNSS device 
Once the major GNSS device (antenna or receiver) is out of use, the second 
GNSS device can fully take the function of the major GNSS device. However, 
the redundant GNSS device is also affected by propagation errors of radio signal 
(without multipath). In this sense, the significance of a redundant GNSS device 
is reflected during the internal failure of the major GNSS device. 
  
(B)  Use of two ore more frequency receiver for future GNSS  
The upcoming availability of additional civilian code on frequencies 
besides the L1 band signals will offer new opportunities. Due to different carrier 
signals, the other carrier signals might not suffer from the same interference or 
jamming as the L1 signal. Also, the channel failure (loss of lock or cycle-slips, 
etc.) for L1 signal might not occur simultaneously on the other frequencies. 
Hardware failure of receiver or antenna might also challenge the reception of all 
carrier signals.  
 
(C) Multiple GNSS systems  
Two or more full-operational GNSS could serve as redundancy for each 
other, as they realize same functions in maritime navigation as specified in [6]. 
Once one GNSS system is shut down or temporarily out of service, its function 
can be replaced by another full-operational GNSS system.  
 
(D) Terrestrial navigation system  
Such systems like e-Loran or R-mode facilitate the functions for positioning 
and time determination, so that these systems could serve as backup for GNSS.  
 
 e-Loran 
e-Loran, the modernized version of Loran-C, is a long-range radio 
navigation system, operating at an assigned frequency of 100 kHz. Currently 
there exists a pre-operational e-Loran network in the UK and Ireland. Although 
the United States switched off their Loran-C service, operational Loran-C 
services can be found in parts of Russia and Asia. So the future of e-Loran as a 
terrestrial backup for GNSS with a large coverage area is currently under 
discussion. Also, the fulfillment of the future maritime requirements in the 
accuracy is an issue. 
 
 R-Mode 
In [2], the Ranging-mode (R-mode) is seen as a possible novel variant of 
positioning technique using terrestrial signals. The idea is to use existing 
communication channels and append their functionality by sending an additional 
timing signal. From the time difference between signal transmission and 
reception, the ship should be able to determine its position. The advantage of this 
idea would be, that at least partially existing infrastructure could be used. 
Currently this is still only an idea and the concept needs to proven. 
 
(E) Inertial Navigation (IMU) 
The development in the field of inertial sensors, with increasing quality of 
rather low cost sensors, makes inertial navigation attractive for future civil 
maritime applications. Inertial navigation can bridge GNSS outage within 
certain duration and can therefore be seen as a short-term contingency for the 
navigation. Additionally it enables integrity monitoring for position and 
navigation information.   
  
(F) e-Pelorus 
The positioning relies on the bearing angles obtained from optic sensor with 
respect to known terrestrial objects. More than two bearing angles allow the 
horizontal positioning. The use of such a technique needs the objects with 
known coordinates and simultaneous tracking of several objects. For this 
purpose, an ‘electronic pelorus’ is proposed [2].  
 
 
4 Proposed architecture of integrity monitoring in a PNT Module  
 
The core element of the proposed PNT Module is the PNT Unit as a value 
added data processing system. By using sensor and data fusion methods the PNT 
Unit is responsible for generating the basic PNT information together with 
integrity information for the data. The integrity monitoring can be carried out in 
three sequential steps. The first step is an individual sensor data test. The second 
step is the compatibility test of similar data from different sensors. The third step 
is the fault detection and identification in the integration algorithm. A general 
integrity monitoring approach is depicted in Figure II. 
 
 
Figure II General integrity monitoring approaches in the integrated sensor system 
 
4.1 Integrity monitoring in integration algorithm 
 
The plausibility tests, validity tests and compatibility tests are suitable for 
detecting gross sensor failure but not sensitive for slight error, time-variant 
errors and drifts. The Kalman filter-based algorithm could offer high sensitivity 
of detecting these errors. Integrity monitoring based on Kalman filter can be 
categorized into the following approaches [5]. 
 
 Kalman filter estimates (bias check) 
In a Kalman filter, the errors of navigation parameters can be estimated. If 
an estimated error is significantly larger than the error level specified by the 
manufacturer, it is likely to be a failure in the sensor. 
 
 Innovation-based approaches 
The innovations indicate the consistency of the actual measurements and 
the measurements predicated by state estimates. Innovation filtering may be used 
to detect large discrepancies immediately, whereas innovation sequence 
monitoring enables smaller discrepancies to be detected over time. 
 
 Residual-based approaches 
The above-mentioned innovation filtering and sequence monitoring can 
also be expanded to residuals. Residuals have a smaller covariance than 
innovation, making them more sensitive for error detection [5]. The only 
shortcoming is that the processing of residuals is not an essential part of a 
Kalman filter routine and needs extra computing time. 
 
 Parallel solution of multiple sub-filters 
Parallel-solutions integrity monitoring maintains a number of parallel 
navigation solutions or sub-filters, each excluding data from one sensor or radio 
navigation signal. Each additional navigation solution is compared with the main 
filter using a consistency test. A significant inconsistency indicates a fault in the 
sensor or signal omitted from main filter. The system output is then switched to 
the solution omitting the faulty sensor or signal. The main drawback lies in the 
increased computational burden and hence this technique is preferably used for 
failure identification rather than failure detection 
 
5.  First experimental results 
 
In order to collect test data for the development and test of the software 
routines for the PNT Unit, first measurement campaigns have been performed in 
cooperation with the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (BSH) on the 
survey and research vessel DENEB. For these experiments the vessel was 
additionally equipped with 3 GNSS antennas and receivers (type: Javad Delta) 
and an IMU (type iMar IVRU FCAI). In Figure III the vessel “DENEB” is 
shown, where the red circles mark the positions of the 3 GNSS antennas and the 
yellow circle indicates the position of the IMU installed near the centerline 
inside the vessel.  
 
Figure III survey and research vessel DENEB 
 
In this paper first data analysis of a measurement campaign performed on 
July 5th in the port of Rostock is presented. In Fig. IV (a) the trajectory of the 
vessel is shown. Coming from the Warnow River the vessel performed an anti 
clock wise turning maneuver on the turning circle and finally it left the port and 
led into the Baltic Sea.  
As mentioned in the last section, the second step in the integrity monitoring 
approach is the compatibility check for PNT data derived from different sensors. 
As one example in Fig. IV (b) the rate of turn (ROT) measured by the IMU and 
ROT derived from heading data of the Gyro Compass is shown. Within the 
specific time interval, no significant systematic differences between both curves 
can be found. In contrary to that, the ship speed measured by the Doppler Log, 
Electromagnetic (EM) Log and the GNSS receiver (1) shows systematic 
differences (see Fig. IV (c)). The biggest differences can be observed within the 
time interval of the turning maneuver. One reason could lay in the fact, that the 
EM Log measures the speed through water (STW) while GNSS and Doppler 
Log measure speed over ground (SOG). Another reason could be the different  
 
Figure IV (a) trajectory of vessel DENEB (on Google maps), 
(b) the ROT derived from Heading and read from IMU 
(c) Speed obtained from different sensors 
positions of these sensors on the ship. In order to check this, the SOG measured 
by the three different GNSS receivers is plotted in Fig. V. Here the measurement 
principles and algorithms are identical and hence the only difference is the 
position of the antennas on the ship (see. Fig. III). 
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Figure V SOG and SOG differences determined by the different GNSS antennas and receivers  
         
Fig. V shows that significant deviations of SOG-information obtained from 
different GNSS receivers occur during the turning maneuver. The largest 
differences can be found between the fore antenna (1) and the aft antennas 
(2+3). This clearly indicates that the observed differences are caused by the 
different sensor locations on the vessel body. These results yield to the following 
consequences for a compatibility check of the SOG data from different sensors: 
a) For a compatibility check with the SOG information obtained from  
different sensors larger differences need to be accepted (at least 
during special maneuvers) or  
b) The SOG measured by the sensors would need to be transformed 
into a consistent common reference point by using additional 
information of the actual vessel attitude and angular rates. 
Option (b) has the disadvantage that the integrity tests for one output parameter 
(here SOG) depends on the availability and integrity of another output parameter 
(here attitude and angular rates). 
 
5. Summary  
  
This paper focuses on a maritime integrated PNT Module as the on-
board part of maritime PNT system. The aim of the PNT Module is the robust 
provision of position, navigation and timing information in accordance with the 
performance requirements of the actual operational region. The core of the PNT 
Module is a PNT Unit. This PNT Unit is a processing system, which combines 
by means of sensor and data fusion methods all available PNT sensors. The PNT 
Module is on the one hand part of the integrated PNT System and on the other 
hand part of the on- board INS. After a short discussion of the sensors of a PNT 
Module we have introduced a preliminary integrity monitoring concept for a 
PNT Module. In a first step towards the development of a PNT Module 
demonstrator system we have performed first measurement campaigns and 
derived PNT output data from different sensors. The analysis of these data 
shows, that for their usage within compatibility tests, the different locations of 
the sensors onboard the vessel needs to be considered.  
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